Here is (in part) what well-known Reformed and Presbyterian Theologian Charles Hodge said regarding our being morally culpable for sinful dispositions that we have inherited from our Ancestors and our hereditary (from his systematic Theology, Volume 2, Part 2, Sections 6ff):
Charles Hodge on Being Morally Culpable for Sinful
Dispositions Even if Inherited from our Ancestors (He argues to deny this is to
move toward Pelagianism/somewhere in between):
Consciousness proves that Dispositions as distinguished from
Acts may have Moral Character
By the mere moral philosopher, and by theologians whose
theology is a philosophy, it is assumed as an axiom, or intuitive truth, that a
man is responsible only for what he has full power to do or to avoid. Plausible
as this principle is, it is,—
1. Opposed to the testimony of consciousness. It is a fact
of consciousness that we do attribute moral character to principles which
precede all voluntary action and which are entirely independent of the power of
the will. And it is a fact capable of the clearest demonstration that such is
not only the dictate of our own individual consciousness, but also the
conviction of all men. If we examine our own consciousness as to the judgment
which we pass upon ourselves, we shall find that we hold ourselves responsible
not only for the deliberate acts of the will, that is, for acts of deliberate
self-determination, which suppose both knowledge and volition, but also for
emotional, impulsive acts, which precede all deliberation; and not only for
such impulsive acts, but also for the principles, dispositions, or immanent
states of the mind, by which its acts whether impulsive or deliberate, are
determined. When a man is convinced of sin, it is not so much for specific acts
of transgression that his conscience condemns him, as for the permanent states
of his mind; his selfishness, worldliness, and maliciousness; his ingratitude,
unbelief, and hardness of heart; his want of right affections, of love to God,
of zeal for the Redeemer, and of benevolence towards men. These are not acts.
They are not states of mind under the control of the will; and yet in the
judgment of conscience, which we cannot silence or pervert, they constitute our
character and are just ground of condemnation. In like manner whatever of right
dispositions or principles we discover within ourselves, whatever there is of
love to God, to Christ, or to his people; whatever of humility, meekness,
forbearance, or of any other virtue; the testimony of consciousness is, that
these dispositions, which are neither the acts nor products of the will, as far
as they exist within us, constitute our character in the sight of God and man.
Such is not only the testimony of consciousness with regard to our judgments of
ourselves, but also as to our judgments of other men. When we pronounce a man
either good or bad, the judgment is not founded upon his acts, but upon his
character as revealed by his acts. The terms good and bad, as applied to men,
are not used to express the character of particular actions which they perform,
but the character of the abiding principles, dispositions, or states of mind
which determine their acts, and give assurance of what they will be in future.
We may look on a good man and know that there is something in him which
constitutes his character, and which renders it certain that he will not
blaspheme, lie, or steal; but, on the contrary, that he will endeavour in all
things to serve God and do good to men. In like manner we may contemplate a
wicked man in the bosom of his family, when every evil passion is hushed, and
when only kindly feelings are in exercise, and yet we know him to be wicked.
That is, we not only know that he has perpetrated wicked actions, but that he
is inherently wicked; that there is in him an evil nature, or abiding state of
the mind, which constitutes his real character and determines his acts. When we
say that a man is a miser, we do not mean simply that he hoards money, or
grinds the face of the poor, but we mean that he has a disposition which in
time past has led to such acts and which will continue to produce them so long
as it rules in his heart. The Pelagian doctrine, therefore, that moral
character can be predicated only of voluntary acts, is contrary to the
testimony of consciousness.
Argument from the General Judgment of Men
2. It may, however, be said that our consciousness or moral
judgments are influenced by our Christian education. It is therefore important
to observe, in the second place, that this judgment of our individual
consciousness is confirmed by the universal judgment of our fellow-men. This is
plain from the fact that in all known languages there are words to distinguish
between dispositions, principles, or habits, as permanent states of the mind,
and voluntary acts. And these dispositions are universally recognized as being
either good or bad. Language is the product of the common consciousness of men.
There could not be such terms as benevolence, justice, integrity, and fidelity,
expressing principles which determine acts, and which are not themselves acts,
if men did not intuitively recognize the fact that principles as well as acts
may have moral character.
The Moral Character of Acts determined by the Principles
whence they flow
3. So far from its being true that in the judgment of men
the voluntary act alone constitutes character, the very opposite is true. The
character of the act is decided by the nature of the principle by which it is
determined. If a man gives alms, or worships God from a selfish principle,
under the control of a disposition to secure the applause of men, those acts
instead of being good are instinctively recognized as evil. Indeed, if this
Pelagian or Rationalistic principle were true, there could be no such thing as
character; not only because individual acts have no moral quality except such
as is derived from the principle whence they flow, but also because character
necessarily supposes something permanent and controlling. A man without
character is a man without principles; i.e., in whom there is nothing which
gives security as to what his acts will be.
Argument from Scripture
4. The Scriptures in this, as in all cases, recognize the
validity of the intuitive and universal judgments of the mind. They everywhere
distinguish between principles and acts, and everywhere attribute moral
character to the former, and to acts only so far as they proceed from
principles. This is the doctrine of our Lord when he says, "Either make
the tree good, and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit
corrupt: for a tree is known by his fruit." (Matt. 12:33.) "A good
tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good
fruit." (Matt. 7:18.) It is the inward, abiding character of the tree that
determines the character of the fruit. The fruit reveals, but does not
constitute, the nature of the tree. So it is, he tells us, with the human
heart. "How can ye, being evil, speak good things? For out of the
abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. A good man out of the good treasure
of the heart, bringeth forth good things: and an evil man, out of the evil
treasure, bringeth forth evil things." (Matt. 12:34, 35.) A good man,
therefore, is one who is inwardly good: who has a good heart, or nature,
something within him which being good in itself, produces good acts. And an
evil man is one, whose heart, that is, the abiding, controlling state of his
mind, being in itself evil, habitually does evil. It is out of the heart
proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false
witness, and blasphemies. These terms include all voluntary acts, not only in
the sense of deliberate self-determination, but also in the sense of
spontaneous acts. They moreover include all conscious states of the mind. It
is, therefore, expressly asserted by our Lord, that moral character attaches to
what lies deeper than any acts of the will, in the widest sense of those words,
but also to that which lies lower than consciousness. As the greater part of
our knowledge is treasured up where consciousness does not reach, so the
greater part of what constitutes our character as good or evil, is lower not
only than the will but even than consciousness itself. It is not only however
by direct assertion that this doctrine is taught in the Bible. It is constantly
assumed, and is involved in some of the most important doctrines of the word of
God. It is taken for granted in what is taught of the moral condition in which
men are born into this world. They are said to be conceived in sin. They are
children of wrath by nature. That which is born of the flesh is flesh, i.e.,
carnal, morally corrupt. The Bible also speaks of indwelling sin; of sin as a
principle which brings forth fruit unto death. It represents regeneration not
as an act of the soul, but as the production of a new nature, or holy
principle, in the heart. The denial, therefore, that dispositions or principles
as distinguished from acts, can have a moral character, subverts some of the
most plainly revealed doctrines of the sacred Scriptures.
The Faith of the Church on this Subject
5. It is fair on this subject to appeal to the universal
faith of the Church. Even the Greek Church, which has the lowest form of
doctrine of any of the great historical Christian communities, teaches that men
need regeneration as soon as they are born, and that by regeneration a change
of nature is effected, or a new principle of life is infused into the soul. So
also the Latin Church, however inconsistently, recognizes the truth of the
doctrine in question in all her teachings. All who die unbaptized, according to
Romanists, perish; and by baptism not only the guilt, but also the pollution of
sin is removed, and new habits of grace are infused into the soul. It is
needless to remark that the Lutheran and Reformed churches agree in holding
this important doctrine, that moral character does not belong exclusively to
voluntary acts, but extends to dispositions, principles, or habits of the mind.
This is involved in all their authoritative decisions concerning original
righteousness, original sin, regeneration, and sanctification.
The Moral Character of Dispositions depends on their Nature
and not on their Origin
The second great principle involved in the Scriptural
doctrine on this subject is, that the moral character of dispositions or habits
depends on their nature and not on their origin. There are some who endeavour
to take a middle ground between the rationalistic and the evangelical
doctrines. They admit that moral character may be predicated of dispositions as
distinguished from voluntary acts, but they insist that this can only be done
when such dispositions have been self-acquired. They acknowledge that the
frequent repetition of certain acts has a tendency to produce an abiding
disposition to perform them. This is acknowledged to be true not only in regard
to the indulgence of sensual appetites, but also in regard to purely mental
acts. Not only does the frequent use of intoxicating liquors produce an
inordinate craving for them, but the frequent exercise of pride or indulgence
of vanity, confirms and strengthens a proud and vainglorious spirit, or state
of mind; which state of mind, when thus produced, it is admitted, goes to
determine or constitute the man's moral character. But they deny that a man can
be responsible for any disposition, or state of mind, which is not the result
of his own voluntary agency. In opposition to this doctrine, and in favour of
the position that the moral character of dispositions, or principles, does not
depend upon their origin, that whether concreated, innate, infused, or
self-acquired they are good or bad according to their nature, the arguments are
the same in kind as those presented under the preceding head.
1. The first is derived from our consciousness. In our
judgments of ourselves the question is what we are, and not how we became what
we know ourselves to be. If conscious that we do not love God as we ought; that
we are worldly, selfish, proud, or suspicious, it is no relief to the
consciousness, that such has been our character from the beginning. We may know
that we were born with these evil dispositions, but they are not on that
account less evil in the sight of conscience. We groan under the burden of hereditary,
or of indwelling sin, as deeply and as intelligently as under the pressure of
our self-acquired evil dispositions. So also in our instinctive judgments of
other men. If a man be addicted to frivolous pursuits, we pronounce
him a frivolous man, without stopping to inquire whether his disposition be
innate, derived by inheritance from his ancestors, or whether it was acquired.
On the contrary, if he manifests from his youth a disposition for the
acquisition of knowledge, he is an object of respect, no matter whence that
disposition was derived. The same is true with regard to amiable or unamiable
dispositions. It cannot be denied that there is a great difference in men in
this respect. Some are morose, irritable, and unsocial in their dispositions,
others are directly the reverse. The one class is attractive, the other
repulsive; the one the object of affection; the other, of dislike. The
instinctive judgment of the mind is the same with regard to dispositions more
clearly moral in their nature. One man is selfish, another generous; one is
malicious, another benevolent; one is upright and honourable, another deceitful
and mean. They may be born with these distinctive traits of character,
and such traits beyond doubt are in numerous cases innate and often hereditary,
and yet we are conscious that our judgment regarding them and those to whom
they belong is entirely independent of the question whether such dispositions
are natural or acquired. It is admitted that nations as well as tribes and
families, have their distinctive characteristics, and that these
characteristics are not only physical and mental, but also social and moral. Some
tribes are treacherous and cruel. Some are mild and confiding. Some are
addicted to gain, others to war. Some are sensual, some intellectual. We
instinctively judge of each according to its character; we like or dislike,
approve or disapprove, without asking ourselves any questions as to the origin
of these distinguishing characteristics. And if we do raise that question,
although we are forced to answer it by admitting that these dispositions are
innate and hereditary, and that they are not self-acquired by the individual
whose character they constitute, we nevertheless, and none the less, approve or
condemn them according to their nature. This is the instinctive and necessary,
and therefore the correct, judgment of the mind.
This the Common Rule of Judgment
2. As in water face answereth to face, so the heart
of man to man. What we find revealed in our own consciousness we find
manifested as the consciousness of our fellow men. It is the instinctive or
intuitive judgment of all men that moral dispositions derive their character
from their nature, and not from their origin. In the ordinary language of men,
to say that a man is naturally proud or malicious is not an extenuation, but an
aggravation. The more deeply these evil principles are seated in his nature, and
the less they depend upon circumstances or voluntary action, the more profound
is our abhorrence and the more severe is our condemnation. The Irish people
have always been remarkable for their fidelity; the English for honesty; the
Germans for truthfulness. These national traits, as revealed in individuals,
are not the effect of self-discipline. They are innate, hereditary
dispositions, as obviously as the physical, mental, or emotional peculiarities
by which one people is distinguished from another. And yet by the common
judgment of men this fact in no degree detracts from the moral character of
these dispositions.
The Testimony of Scripture
3. This also is the plain doctrine of the Bible. The
Scriptures teach that God made man upright; that the angels were created holy,
for the unholy angels are those which kept not their first estate; that since
the fall men are born in sin; that by the power of God, and not by the power of
the will, the heart is changed, and new dispositions are implanted in our
nature; and yet the Bible always speaks of the sinful as sinful and worthy of
condemnation, whether, as in the case of Adam, that sinfulness was self-acquired,
or, as in the case of his posterity, it is a hereditary evil. It always speaks
of the holy as holy, whether so created as were the angels, or made so by the
supernatural power of the Spirit in regeneration and sanctification. And in so
doing the Bible, as we have seen, does not contradict the intuitive judgment of
the human mind, but sanctions and confirms that judgment.
The Faith of the Church
4. It need hardly be added that such also is the faith of
the Church universal. All Christian churches receive the doctrines of original
sin and regeneration in a form which involves not only the principle that
dispositions, as distinguished from acts, may have a moral character, but also
that such character belongs to them whether they be innate, acquired, or
infused. It is, therefore, most unreasonable to assume the ground that a man
can be responsible only for his voluntary acts, or for their subjective effects,
when our own consciousness, the universal judgment of men, the word of God, and
the Church universal, so distinctly assert the contrary. It is a matter of
surprise how subtle is the poison of the principle which has now been
considered. It is not only the fundamental principle of Pelagianism, but it is
often asserted by orthodox theologians who do not carry it out to its
legitimate results, but who, nevertheless, allow it injuriously to modify their
views of some of the most important doctrines of the Bible. On the assumption
that no man can be judged, can be either justified or condemned except on the
ground of his self-acquired personal character, they teach that there can be no
immediate imputation of the sin of Adam or of the righteousness of Christ; that
the only ground of condemnation must be our self-acquired sinfulness, and the
only ground of justification our subjective righteousness; thus subverting two
of the main pillars of evangelical truth.
Objections Considered
The difficulty on this subject arises in great measure from
confounding two distinct things. It is one thing that a creature should be
treated according to his character; and quite another thing to account for his
having that character. If a creature is holy he will be regarded and treated as
holy. If he is sinful, he will be regarded and treated as sinful. If God
created Adam holy He could not treat him as unholy. If He created Satan sinful,
He would regard him as sinful; and if men are born in sin they cannot be
regarded as free from sin. The difficulty is not in God's treating his
creatures according to their true character, but in reconciling with his
holiness and justice that a sinful character should be acquired without the
creature's personal agency. If God had created Satan sinful he would be sinful,
but we should not know how to reconcile it with the character of God that he
should be so created. And if men are born in sin the difficulty is not in their
being regarded and treated as sinful, but in their being thus born. The Bible
teaches us the solution of this difficulty. It reveals to us the principle of
representation, on the ground of which the penalty of Adam's sin has come upon
his posterity as the reward of Christ's righteousness comes upon his people. In
the one case the penalty brings subjective sinfulness, and in the other the
reward brings subjective holiness.
It is a common objection to the doctrine that holiness can
be concreated and sinfulness hereditary, that it makes sin and holiness
substances. There is nothing in the soul, it is said, but its substance and its
acts. If sin or holiness be predicated of anything but the acts of the soul it
must be predicated of its substance; and thus we have the doctrine of physical
holiness and physical depravity. The assumption on which this objection rests
is not only an arbitrary one, but it is obviously erroneous. There are in the
soul, (1.) Its substance. (2.) Its essential properties or attributes, as
reason, sensibility, and will, without which it ceases to be a human soul. (3.)
Its constitutional dispositions, or natural tendencies to exercise certain
feelings and volitions, such as self-love, the sense of justice, the social
principle, parental and filial affection. These, although not essential to man,
are nevertheless found in all men, before and after the fall. (4.) The peculiar
dispositions of individual men, which are accidental, that is, they do not
belong to humanity as such. They may be present or absent; they may be innate
or acquired. Such are the taste for music, painting, or poetry; and the skill
of the artist or the mechanist; such also are covetousness, pride, vanity, and
the like; and such, too, are the graces of the Spirit, humility, meekness,
gentleness, faith, love, etc. As the taste for music is neither an act nor a
substance, so pride is neither the one nor the other. Nor is the maternal
instinct an act; nor is benevolence or covetousness. These are immanent,
abiding states of the mind. They belong to the man, whether they are active or
dormant, whether he is awake or asleep. There is something in the sleeping
artist which renders it certain that he will enjoy and execute what other men
can neither perceive nor do. And that something is neither the essence of his
soul nor an act. It is a natural or acquired taste and skill. So there is
something in the sleeping saint which is neither essence nor act, which renders
it certain that he will love and serve God. As therefore there are in the soul
dispositions, principles, habits, and tastes which cannot be regarded as mere
acts, and yet do not belong to the essence of the soul, it is plain that the
doctrine of original or concreated righteousness is not liable to the objection
of making moral character a substance.
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Agree or disagree in part or in whole (I have my own thoughts), but this broadly considered has been the long standing position and testimony of the Reformed churches, of mankind through the light of nature, etc., until probably the last 100 years or so. Remember that Hodge was basically writing" Turretin for Dummies like me who can't read Latin" in the 1800's. Scripture often speaks of the sinfulness of particular peoples or nations, the Cretans are singled out even as Sodom and Gomorrah once were, etc. The good news is that, by God's grace, wherever we come from humanly speaking, we can be redeemed and renewed by the grace of God, forgiven of our sins, and enabled to fight against our sinful passions and overcome sin. This is true of the most developed and most primitive of peoples. But we should be sober-minded and realize there is such a thing as civil and uncivil human beings in this world. So repent and believe the Gospel, and you shall be saved, you and your household, for Christ is calling out a people from every tribe, tongue, and nation, from the least to the greatest, to be His own holy nation and people.
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